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THE ENNOBLING OF DEMOCRACY: THE
CHALLENGE OF THE POSTMODERN AGE
By Thomas L. Pangle. Baltimore:
1992. viii + 228 pp.

Johns Hopkins University Press,

Reviewed by Fernando R. Tesdn*
INTRODUCTION

A liberal society, one founded upon individual freedom and democratic principles, is hard to build and harder to preserve. Democratic
institutions are fragile, and what John Rawls calls "the strains of
commitment" are permanent features of even the most enlightened civil
societies.' This is why every once in a while the world of ideas is shaken
by a frontal revolt against freedom and reason: the stress of civilization
tempts too many a thinker, too many a politician, into utopian or
authoritarian proposals. While these cyclical revolts have come in many
shapes (some from the right, some from the left) they share this common
trait: the twin rejection of rationality and freedom. Challenges to the
Enlightenment are always, almost by definition, anti-rationalist and
authoritarian.2 The rejection of the open society has not been confined,
alas, to the realm of ideas: every single time any such theory has been
implemented it has resulted in a horrifying disaster. Millions of people
have perished or languished in concentration and reeducation camps,
purges, torture chambers, and wars, not to mention the setbacks suffered
under these regimes by the industries, the arts, and all other high forms
of human endeavor.
Today, after the collapse of communism, the new revolt against
freedom and reason comes under the label "post-modernism. ''3 What
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University; Visiting Professor, Indiana University
School of Law (Bloomington), spring 1993; University of Buenos Aires, J.D. (1975),

University of Brussels, Lic.Dr.Int'l (1982), Northwestern University, S.J.D. (1987).

1. According to John Rawls, one virtue of a theory of justice is its ability to withstand

the burdens entailed by compliance-these are the strains of commitment.

See JOHN

RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 175-77 (1971).
2. Some of the most notorious philosophers of despair are Plato, Nietzsche, Hegel, and
Marx. See generally KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (2d ed. 1966).
Of course, the fact that they were enemies of freedom does not mean that their contribution
was not valuable in other respects.
3. I include in the term "post-modernist" here a Variety of radical views such as radical
feminism, deconstructionism (at least when applied to politics and morality), and critical
legal studies, among others.

Spring 1993]

The Ennobling of Democracy

seemed at first harmless and sometimes silly views on art, architecture,
and literature, have now been extended to law, ethics, and politics. Space
here prevents me from analyzing in detail the postmodernist movement;
the curious reader will find enough representative quotations in the first
chapter of the book under review. Yet I will say this much: the main
tenet of postmodernism is a wholesale rejection of the philosophical and
political project of the Enlightenment. In epistemology, postmodemists
reject the possibility of supplying any foundation of morality or knowledge. In politics, they are also anti-foundationalists and advocate, in
addition, a radical moral skepticism.4
What is the appropriate response of those committed to the principles
of human rights, democracy, and rational discourse to the onslaught
engineered by postmodernists? Thomas Pangle, a professor of political
science at the University of Toronto, attempts such a response in this
book.5 For him, the postmodernist challenge must be answered with a
return to the neglected principles of classical republicanism, as modemized by the American experience of human rights and democracy. For
Pangle, this American experience owes much more to classical republicanism than we might at first suppose.6 Pangle sketches answers to a
host of social and political issues from this perspective. Perhaps the most
conspicuous of these is his suggestion, defended by others before him,
that in higher education we must return to the "Great Books" tradition in
order to rescue "classic-American" civic republicanism, which has
unfortunately been replaced by the fragmented, morally unconnected, and
hopelessly relativistic outlook so characteristic of modem intellectual life
in America-the saddest, though not the only, expressions of which are
found in our modem universities. 7
This is a valuable, though mistaken, book. Professor Pangle has very
important things to say, and many of his critical observations ring
convincing. His reading of some authors (notably Plato, Hobbes, and

4. I make the distinction between anti-foundationalism and moral skepticism because
the latter does not necessarily follow from the former. Ronald Dworkin, for example, is
anti-foundationalist in the epistemological sense, but decidedly not a moral skeptic: he can
be seen more as a "coherentist" in legal and political morality. See generally RONALD
DWORIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). I am grateful to my colleague J.G. Murphy for having
called my attention to this point.
5.

THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE ENNOBLING OF DEMOCRACY:

POSTMODERN AGE (1992).
6. See id. at 117-19, 150.
7. Id. at 195-218.
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Kant) is somewhat idiosyncratic,8 yet his scholarship and erudition are
remarkable. In particular, he does a good job of exposing the dangers
and fallacies of post-modernism (although in my view he takes it too
seriously). On the other hand, Professor Pangle's style is a bit difficult
to follow, because he overuses the rhetorical question device. This
impairs the tightness of the argument at crucial parts in the book, but this
writing style is surely deliberate, given his passionate defense of the art
of rhetoric. 9 Yet the main objection to this book is substantive: I have
grave reservations about Professor Pangle's answer to the radical
skepticism put forth by postmodernist thinkers. In particular, I am not
convinced that liberalism can or should be defended by a return to
classical republicanism. Indeed, I do not think that one can successfully
defend freedom by merely relying on any one tradition. Liberalism, like
any other belief, must be defended by rational argument; yet appeal only
to tradition is irrational because it is an appeal to authority. A rational
person will not defer to moral authority. 10
I will examine Professor Pangle's discussion of postmodernism and
his own defense of a renewed form of classical republicanism as a reply
to the postmodernist challenge. I will then offer some conclusions.
I. THE DISCUSSION OF POST-MODERNISM
Pangle begins by discussing postmodernist thinking, mostly as
represented by the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard in Europe. Here the
reader is faced with the laborious task of deciphering the prose of modem
Continental thinkers." Indeed, there is a real difference in philosophical
method between those trained in the analytical tradition and those

8. Pangle endorses Milton's view that Plato's advocacy of a totalitarian society in The
Republic was not meant seriously. Id. at 124-25. He regards Hobbes as a believer in the
fundamental importance of human rights. Id. at 93-94. Furthermore, he views Kant's moral
and political philosophy as being closer to a "virtue" classical republicanism than to
liberalism. Id. at 10-13. I need not take a position on the accuracy of these views since

they are not critical to Pangle's argument. But they are questionable, to say the least.
9. Id. at 128-30.
10. There are, of course, situations in which deferring to authority is not irrational, as
when we justify taking medication because the doctor prescribed it. In these cases, we
regard doctors as experts. But there is no such thing as a moral expert.
11. Consider this sample:
The modem aesthetic is an aesthetic of the sublime, but nostalgic; it permits the
adducing of the unpresentable only as an absent content, while permitting the form to
continue to offer to the reader or viewer matter for consolation and pleasure, thanks
The postmodern would be that which in the
to its recognizable consistency ....
modern adduces the unpresentable in the presentation itself ....
PANGLE, supra note 5, at 24 (quoting JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, LE POSTMODERNE
EXPLIQUf Aux ENFANTS 32-33 (1986)).
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informed by Continental philosophical thinking. It seems that the latter
are committed, not to rational argument, but to a philosophy consisting
of ex-cathedra utterances and of insights which need not be supported by
careful reasoning. I am not sure how to settle this difference in any
conclusive way, except by saying that rational ways of argument seem
more likely than oracular pronouncements to advance knowledge,
tolerance, and human welfare.
Thus, postmodernist writers rarely offer rational arguments to support
their conclusions, et pour cause, since one of their tenets is the rejection
of rationality. Rather, postmodernists are concerned with the aesthetics
of propositions and, as Wittgenstein once said, might feel that supplying
arguments ruins the beauty of the insight. Postmodernists thus attempt
to convey a mood or a feeling, rather than to persuade. The conveyance
of the mood of chaos, of the "postmodernist morass," is more important
than defending any set of coherent doctrines. Postmodernists invite us to
reflect upon our angst, upon the fragility of our most cherished beliefs,
and upon how relative and ephemeral everything really is.
A far-reaching effect of this introspection is the impossibility of any
form of ethical or political truth. We cannot possibly start to fathom
justice. Here we may turn to another leading postmodernist thinker,
Jacques Derrida, for whom justice is at the same time absolute and
unknowable.12 For Derrida, Kant was right that acting justly meant acting
out of a categorical principle, that is, a principle not conditioned by
circumstance and history. But Kant was wrong in believing that there is
any way of knowing the content of justice. Thus for Derrida, justice is
a blind search, and the moment that we dare say "this is just," we know
we are wrong.
In a similar although less humane vein, Lyotard asks himself what we
are going to put in place of the "now-discredited Kantian moral law and
the universal rights of man." As Pangle correctly points out, not much:
just "a vague and nostalgic evocation of... a bankrupt Marxist notion
of world proletarian revolution .... In Lyotard's words:
Capitalism pretends to universality. The wrong that capitalism inflicts
on speech would then be a universal wrong. But if the wrong is not
universal, the silent sentiment that signals a diversity [un diffirend]
remains to be heard ....14It is thus that Marxism has not finished, as
sentiment of the diversity.
12. Jacques Derrida, answer to questions at a seminar, Cardozo School of Law, New
York (Nov. 23, 1992) (conducted by Professor Drucilla Cornell).
13. PANGLE, supra note 5, at 27.
14. Id. (quoting JEAN-FRANcOIS LYOTARD, LE DIFF9REND 246 (1983)).
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If the reader still has problems understanding the import of these
statements, he can turn to a book addressed to the young, where Lyotard
calls for a "war against everything."' 5 The morality that results from
these thoughts is a mixture of sentimental Marxism, dogmatic nihilism,
and, as Pangle points out, simple-minded paganism: Lyotard's attack
against Judaism and Christianity borders on hysteria. Not only that.
Pangle observes that, in fact, "Lyotard's postmodernist paganism is
antirational and antiphilosophic feminism," because, in Lyotard's own
words, "[t]he philosopher is as such a secret accomplice of the phallocrat
....[Philosophy] is the mental illness of the West .... [T]he language
of philosophy... is from the beginning the language of masculinity in
the Western sense .... 6 Pangle correctly unveils the doctrine behind
these ruminations: "[Women do not philosophize, at least not like men,
since reasoning does not suit them .... Lyotard means this as a
compliment." 7 This sexist doctrine is, unfortunately, espoused by many
present radical feminists. 18
As Professor Pangle rightly points out, these ideas owe almost
everything to Nietzsche and Heidegger. 19 Pangle persuasively shows the
connection between Lyotard's ideas and Heidegger's work. Yet the most
valuable insight here is not so much the conceptual connection between
the two, but the fact that in each case, the theoretical assault against
liberalism is historically connected with the actual infliction of unspeakable human suffering." ° The link between Heidegger and Nazi repression
is well known, but less has been said about the connection between
nihilist neo-Marxist theory (of which postmodernism is, in my opinion,
but an impoverished by-product) and Communist repression.2

15. Id.(quoting LYOTARD, supra note 11, at 33-34).
16. Id. at 31 (quoting JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, RUDIMENTS PAIENS (1977)) (emphasis
in the original).
17. Il
18. See Fernando R. Tes6n, Feminism and International Law: A Reply (1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw). The
substance of this manuscript will be published as a chapter in my book The Philosophy of
International Law (Westview Press, forthcoming).

19. See PANGLE, supra note 5, 35-47.
20. On the undisputed link between Heidegger and Nazi theory and practice, see id. at
41-47.
21. After the collapse of communism, one can legitimately raise the issue of the moral
complicity of the academic West-the leftist avant-garde. The same people that from their

professorial chairs today proclaim the theoretical bankruptcy of liberalism and democracy
are the ones that for decades made excuses for the Gulags, the secret police, the massacres,

and the violations of basic human rights in the former Soviet Union and its satellite
countries. These people consistently blamed the West for all the world evils: the Cold War,
world hunger, and even oppression, notwithstanding the fact that Western nations for several
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Yet not all is negative about postmodernism. In theory at least,
postmodernists differ from radical Marxists and Hegelians in one
important respect: they reject any attempt at providing a foundation of
knowledge or ethics. For them, it is just as false to believe dogmatically
in the empire of reason and the rule of law, as it is to believe dogmatically in the proletarian revolution or historical materialism.22 As Pangle puts
it:
[Postmodemists] remain morally committed to a vaguely anarchistic
democratism, simultaneously warning us of the exclusivistic tendencies
of moral dogmatism, of the danger that standards can lead to oppressive
hierarchies, of the ease with which devotion to causes, even beautiful
causes, can obfuscate the elemental fellowship of human beings as
human beings. 23
Pangle acknowledges the usefulness of this position when it is
directed against the totalitarian temptations represented by left-wing
Hegelianism and Marxism and against the "scientism and neo-Darwinism
that have marked and marred so much of American philosophy,"
including here the philosophy of Jfirgen Habermas, which Pangle
dismisses as a "dangerously vague philosophic abstraction" guilty of a
"politically naive indifference to24constitutionalism and legalism" and of
"remarkable self-righteousness."
In summary, postmodernism poses a skeptical frontal challenge to the
previously self-confident liberal belief in moral and scientific truth and
progress. This includes, but is not limited to, a rejection of the possibility
of rationally defending our beliefs in democracy and human rights.
Postmodernists are skeptical, not only of any form of dogma (which is a
healthy attitude), but, more radically, of any attempt at moral and political
objectivity. This radical skepticism also covers, at least in theory,
alternatives to liberalism such as Marxism.

decades bravely kept the human rights banner alive against a hostile alliance of dictators in
the United Nations. Of course, members of the academic left are wholly within their rights
to express these opinions, and liberals ought to join them in the defense of those rights. Yet
they are guilty, at the very least, of unforgivable moral irresponsibility. They deserve scorn
of the same kind, although perhaps not to the same extent (given the degree of collaboration) as was rightly visited on apologists of fascism, such as Heidegger, Charles Lindbergh,
and Ezra Pound.
22. I am grateful to Dr. Claudia Ferman of the University of Richmond for having
called my attention to this point. I say "in theory" because in fact most people who hold
these views are also morally indignant against Western society. They frequently
characterize democracy as a myth invented with the purpose of "disenfranchising" vast
numbers of people.
23.

PANGLE, supra

24. Id.

note 5, at 53.
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COMMUNITARIAN OR LIBERAL?

At the risk of oversimplifying, one can say that postmodernism
attacks rationalism and tradition. Pangle comes resolutely to the defense
of tradition, but partly joins postmodemists in their distrust of the modem
rationalism embodied in the Enlightenment. He wants to defend tradition
even where it seems to conflict with claims to follow the path of our free
intellect, wherever it can lead us. Hence the dilemma, as I see it, is this:
there are two possible responses to the postmodernist assault against
liberal values. The first is the liberal response, as articulated by neoKantians such as Rawls and their followers: we can and must rationally
(i.e., critically) defend our beliefs in the ethical-political values of human
rights and democracy.25 The second is the communitarian (or conservative) response: we cannot rationally defend those values; we must
instead appeal to our traditionsand go further and further back in history
(starting in Ancient Greece) in order to clarify and advocate, with awe
and reverence, the principles, values, and reasons articulated by our
forefathers.26
Professor Pangle unequivocally places himself in the second group.
This is most evident when he discusses education. He forcefully argues
for inculcating our traditions in the young, because a relativistic education
does not foster in students a "passionate concern for deciphering what can
be learned from the text or from the work of art," nor a moral sense, a
sense of good and evil.27 What relativism fosters instead in the young is
a "pensierodebole, a weak thinking, characterized by a superficial sense
' '2
of satisfaction that masks a fundamental emptiness of the spirit. 8

It is hard to disagree with Professor Pangle on the need to teach
liberal values to the young. Here is where communitarians are at their
best, because even free-thinking liberals would have to make room for
some appeal to authority in the field of education. We must teach

25. This characterization is correct, I believe, of Rawls' philosophy as expounded in
A Theory of Justice. See RAWLS, supra note 1. I am less sure about his more recent
writings, which seem to have moved'toward a more communitarian or relativist position.
26. It would be a mistake, however, to identify traditionalists with communitarians.
All communitarians are traditionalists, but not the other way around. There are people who
follow traditions that are not the ones of the community (e.g., a religious tradition). A
communitarian is one who appeals to the traditions of the political community to which he
belongs. It would also be a mistake to accuse communitarians of endorsing whatever the
majority decides; they appeal to the values embedded in the tradition of the community,
which may or may not be reflected in what the group decides at any given time.
27. PANGLE, supra note 5, at 55.

28. Id.
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children the importance of human rights and democracy and a reverence
for liberal values, the Constitution and tolerance well before they have
fully developed their capacities for autonomous rational choices. This is
a position that many liberals would embrace, I think, on the grounds that
pupils need some paternalistic guidance while they are still vulnerable to
moral corruption and are psychologically incapable of resisting that
corruption.
The problem with the kind of communitarianism defended by Pangle
is that it views everybody in civil society (not just children) as needing
this uncritical appeal to authority in order to reflect upon the grounds of
their moral and civic behavior. This the liberal cannot accept. The
mistake that Pangle and other civic republicans make is to believe that
liberalism is prepared to honor any preference, no matter how immoral
or idiotic. Nothing could be farther from the spirit of liberal philosophy,
at least the one grounded in the Kantian tradition. Autonomy-based
liberals honor rationalpreferences, not just any preferences. Consequently, true liberals are perfectly willing to join communitarians in their
resistance against the radical assault on freedom and against the mindless,
spineless, and amoral relativism that permeates so much of contemporary
education, culture, and everyday life. Liberals and communitarians are
at one in defending decency, freedom, and democratic principles against
the modem smug nihilist attitude, based on a spurious "tolerance,"
according to which we should not attempt to distinguish between right
and wrong lest we be accused of "insensitivity" toward "diversity" of
views. Thus, Professor Pangle is right on target when he identifies the
deleterious effect of this type of thinking on our commitment to human
rights:
[T]he American commitment to human rights has become more and
more blurred and ambiguous. Undermined at home by demands for
reverse discrimination and assaulted in the United Nations and abroad
by Third World tyrants' self-serving perversions of the meaning of
human rights, the original American understanding of a small granite
core of inalienable rights inhering equally in every individual ...
threatens to become obscured.29
Except for the blanket condemnation of reverse discrimination (which on
liberal principles is a complicated issue) and the reference to the "original
American understanding," these are words liberals should endorse.
Yet there remains a crucial difference between liberals and conservatives. Liberals, while resolutely defending freedom and democracy, are

29. Id. at 74-75.
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willing to live with the considerable degree of unpredictability entailed
by a respect for autonomy. In contrast, conservatives are distrustful of
rapid change, obsessed with the danger of anarchy, and, in their quest for
stability, sometimes willing to curtail freedom. In the words of Friedrich
von Hayek, "the conservative feels safe and content only if he is assured
that some higher wisdom watches and supervises change, only if he
knows that some authority is charged with keeping the change 'orderly."' 3
Professor Pangle's inconsistency in following this appeal to
authority and tradition is at odds with the fundamental premise of
liberalism: the respect for individual liberty, even at the cost of some
unpredictability of social outcomes.
An example of the dangers inherent in the conservative world view
is Professor Pangle's endorsement of self-censorship." Self-censorship
ought to be distinguished from restraint. Self-censorship is the deliberate
refusal to say what one believes to be the truth, solely for political
reasons. Intellectual restraint has more to do both with honest self-doubt
and with the manner in which truth is conveyed. In my view, Professor
Pangle overlooks the dangers of self-censorship against the backdrop of
state coercion. Self-censorship encourages rulers to abuse their power.
And in an authoritarian regime, instances of direct state censorship or
muzzling of dissidents are relatively rare; rather, citizens exercise selfcensorship based on a vaguely felt yet ultimately rational fear.
To be sure, there is some truth to the conservative argument. This
is the warning issued by Burke that we should be very slow in dismantling institutions that are the result of aggregative historical processes over
long periods of time.32 It seems to me that the correct view is some kind
of Burkean liberalism: we believe, on independent philosophical grounds,
that liberal institutions constitute the best arrangement of human affairs.
Therefore, changes away from those institutions should be undertaken
with great care and caution, and only after the gravest of reflections. To
put this point more generally, our approach to received traditions ought
to be sympathetic but always critical. We must be slow to abandon
received doctrines; but if on reflection we believe they are morally
indefensible, we must abandon them, no matter how long established,

30. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, WHY I AM NOT A CONSERVATIVE (1960) (essay), cited in Philip
D. Harvey, The Soviet Conservative Is a Communist, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1990, at A16.
31. PANGLE, supra note 5, at 124-26.
32. See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE
(Thomas H.D. Mahoney ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1955) (1790).
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because they have turned out to be mere prejudices.33
To cite but one example, the classic republican tradition, as Pangle
readily acknowledges, is unsympathetic or oblivious to human rights;
rights are, after all, the children of the Enlightenment. The liberal has
critical philosophical arguments, independent of tradition, to justify
respect for human rights. Therefore, the classic republican tradition, no
matter how admirable in some regards, is flawed in precisely that feature
which we regard as central to the justification of modem political
institutions. If, in spite of this, one wishes to cling to the idea that
following tradition is important, one should be concerned with reconstructing and elaborating the liberaltradition derived from the Enlightenment (much in the way Rawls does it). Unfortunately, there is not much
room for Plato and Aristotle in that task.
Even in the field of education, where appeal to tradition seems more
in order, Professor Pangle's defense of the Great Books approach is
unconvincing. To be sure, if my only choices were either the Great
Books curriculum or the "multicultural" approach that currently dominates our universities' undergraduate curricula, that choice would be easy
indeed. "Multiculturalism" in the sense advocated by those in charge of
today's universities is hardly based on toleration and respect for other
cultures: it is instead a thinly disguised political activism directed at
destroying or demeaning liberal values and Western culture.'
In
Professor Pangle's own eloquent prose:
The watchwords of the more advanced intellectual life of the United
States today are empowerment and deconstruction, terms signalling the
fact that among academic elites, the pervasive relativism is neither openminded and tolerant nor easy-going and dispassionate. What is
characteristic ... is not simply a loss of belief in ... the faith and
philosophy of the American republican founding. What is most
characteristic of "politically correct thinking" is a morally indignant
reaction against the lifeblood ... of the nation. 5
These are strong and accurate words (as anyone daring to oppose the
33. This is what I take to be the essence of John Rawls's "reflective equilibrium." See
RAWLS, supra note 1, at 48-51.
34. The reaction against multiculturalism was once the province of conservatives. See,
e.g., DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON
CAMPus (1991). Liberals, however, are increasingly expressing their concerns about its
destructive effects. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA:
REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (1991).
35. PANGLE, supra note 5, at 75. Pangle attacks, on the one hand, critical legal studies
and radical feminism for portraying American law and society as "male chauvinist, racist,
plutocratic, exploitative," and on the other hand, the law and economics movement for
rejecting the idea of following the original intention of the founders of the republic. Id.
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new campus orthodoxy can tell), but the answer is not to build the
colleges' curricula around a predetermined and fixed list of Great Books.
The books our students read must indeed be great, but the list ought
always be ready for revision on the grounds of academic excellence,
depth of insight, and other intellectual and aesthetic values (including
diversity as one value). The critical requirement, however, is that these
values in education ought to be pursued with the highest commitment to
a disinterested pursuit of the truth, and not as part of a political agenda.
This is yet another example of the already noted difference between
liberals and conservatives. Conservatives wrongly believe that the main
reason for present decadence has been a departure from, and a loss of
reverence for, the classical authors. Conservatives cling to the past. In
contrast, liberals insist on critical examination of new and old books
according to a standard of intellectual integrity. For example, we would
be well advised to depart from the solutions advocated by Plato in The
Republic. In doing so, we expect to educate the students about the kinds
of arguments that show why Plato ought not be followed in his fierce
opposition to democracy. 36 More generally, liberals believe in intellectual
and moral progress, and are thus open to new ideas and challenges that
may enrich our spirit. So the dilemma between an uncritical return to the
Great Books and "multicultural" illiberal indoctrination is, for the liberal,
a false dilemma. And, significantly, the liberal rejects them because both
are equally inimical to the empire of reason.
Another more concrete and political, yet inescapable, problem with
the kind of communitarianism defended by Pangle is that it does not sit
well with a vindication of international human rights. For the premise
behind the advocacy of international human rights is that they accrue to
people regardless of history, culture, and tradition. Fundamental rights
are universal.37 Pangle rightly complains about the distortions of the
meaning of human rights forced by the "Marxist-inspired" United Nations
majorities of the recent past,38 but he seems unaware that a mere appeal

36. I am aware of the view, held by Professor Pangle, that Plato was not really an
enemy of democracy. See supra note 8. Aside from the evidence to the contrary (see, e.g.,
POPPER, supra note 2, vol. 1), I believe that scholars ought to be taken at their word, and

are therefore responsible for the doctrines they advocate, even if they did not really mean
them seriously, so long as they were aware that those doctrines could be taken seriously by
readers.
37. I have argued this at length in my published writings, the most recent of which is
Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 53

(1992).
38. PANGLE, supra note 5, at 142. I do not concur, however, with Pangle's dogmatic
defense of a strong right of private property. For some reason, liberals are generally less
indignant than conservatives about invasions of the right to property; and care less about

Spring 1993]

The Ennobling of Democracy

to Western tradition cannot justify the extension of basic human rights to
every individual in the globe. This is true, a fortiori, of appeals to premodem classic republicanism. Governments ought to honor human rights
because that is the right thing to do, not because so doing is consistent
with this or that tradition.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, while Professor Pangle's book is a passionate,
intelligent, and erudite attempt to defend institutions that most of us
cherish, I do not believe that philosophy ought be chained to tradition in
the way he suggests, in particular to the classic republican tradition
which, if undiluted, exhibits troubling authoritarian overtones. So
Professor Pangle's response is, I believe, unpersuasive. Yet he deserves
praise for having courageously joined his voice to the few that have so
far raised theirs against the academic irrationalism of our times-a view
of human nature, ethics, and politics that all freedom-loving people have
the duty to resist with the best of our intellectual energies.

property than about other human rights. But I cannot pursue this issue further.

